This article addresses the tension between the secular,
I. Introduction
On March 1, 1994, a horrifying act of anti-Semitism left fifteen-year-old Aaron Halbertstam mortally wounded:
[That morning], a blue 1978 Chevrolet Impala pulled next to a van as it began to cross the Brooklyn Bridge. The van was carrying fifteen students from the Lubavitch Hasidic Jewish sect returning from a prayer vigil in Manhattan. As the car neared the van, a lone gunman fired at least five rounds of bullets from two separate semiautomatic weapons into the side of the van while reportedly yelling, "Kill the Jews." Four students were injured, two critically. Following the incident, Mr. Halberstam, who was inside the van, was rushed to a New York City hospital where he was declared brain dead, but at the request of his parents and rabbis he was placed on a ventilator for as long as his heart could potentially beat independently.
2 Generally, Mr. Halberstam's condition, "irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain," 3 would fulfill the criteria for a legal determination of death in New York State. However, the Jewish law definition of death sought by Mr. Halberstam's family, "irreversible cessation of respiration," 4 was substituted by way of the religious exception to the New York determination of death regulation. 5 If not for the religious exception to the New York law, Mr. Halberstam would have been declared dead and removed from life support, an event that no doubt would have greatly troubled his family as it would have denied Mr. Halberstam the ability to die in accordance with his religious beliefs. This article will address the tension between the secular definition of death and the Jewish law definition of death that arises in situations like Mr. Halbertstam's. While the definition of death has been debated separately in both Jewish and American legal scholarship, the Jewish law and secular definitions of death have not been thoroughly analyzed in relation to one another. This article will argue that New York's definition of death law embodies fairness by acknowledging the competing goals at issue in the legal definition of death-the recognition of the personal and private nature of death that a religious exception would provide versus the accomplishment of secular and state objectives such as uniformity and accuracy. This article will demonstrate that because the New York law permits use of the Jewish law standard without undermining important secular and state objectives, every state should adopt a similar provision.
The balance of this article will proceed as follows. Part II will provide background on the significance of Jewish law and the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform viewpoints on the Jewish law definition of death. Part III will 2 Id. at 137-38. outline the American, secular definition of "brain death" promulgated in the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). 6 Part IV will compare the UDDA brain death standard to the Jewish law cardiac death standard and argue that because both standards accomplish similar societal goals a religious exception to the UDDA would not upset the purpose of the UDDA. Finally, Part V will explain that it is necessary, based on the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment 7 and the right to privacy, 8 that states adopt a UDDA approach modified as the New York law is to include an exception to brain death for those whose religious beliefs call for cardiac death. Such an exception will not burden secular justifications or state interests in the use of the brain death standard.
II. Jewish law and the Jewish law definition of death

A. The significance of Jewish law
Judaism is a religion comprised of its laws. Jewish law, or "halakhah", is not simply a legal code separate from the Jewish religion. 9 Rather, halakhah "has a religious connotation, [it is] a statement of faith, a commitment to one's Creator."
10 Jewish law is significant to Jews because the practice of halakhah stems from God's words in the Torah. 11 The word "halakhah" comes from the Hebrew root word "halokh," meaning "to walk," which indicates that halakhah is the path of life for Jewish people. 12 Jews believe that following halakhah gives humans a sense of purpose and fosters rational decision making. 13 Halakhah 6 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1 (1981) ("An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.").
7 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting a free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 490, 562-63 (1992) (noting that the free exercise of religion supports aspects of the right to privacy, such as the right to define the "terms upon which . . . death will be decided").
9 MENDELL LEWITTES, PRINCIPLES AND DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH LAW 3 (1987). 10 Id.
11 Id. at 4. 12 Id. at 54. 13 Id.
guides all aspects of Jewish life, including civil, criminal, and religious inquiries.
14 In contrast to American law and secular culture, which revolves around ideals of liberty, privacy, and personal autonomy, Jewish law and culture centers largely on the idea of human duty and responsibility. 15 Halakhah is intertwined with the faith-based aspects of Judaism to the extent that the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides, one of the most comprehensive codes of Jewish law, begins not with Jewish legal obligations, but with the fundamental principles of Jewish faith and belief. 16 Other authoritative sources of halakhah are the main works used to guide Jewish practitioners in their observance of the Jewish religion: the Torah, the Talmud, and the "responsa".
17
The fundamental duties of halakhah are codified in the Torah, 18 which is the written Jewish law. 19 The oral Jewish law is found in the Talmud, which is comprised of sixty-three tractates of interpretation and analysis crafted by rabbis and Jewish scholars beginning in the second century with Rabbi Judah the Prince through the Shulchan Aruch created by Rabbi Joseph Karo in the fifteenth century. 20 The Talmud is considered necessary for Jewish society to operate because it provides essential elaboration on the Torah. 21 Finally, rabbinic literature dating back to the sixth century, called "responsa," complement the Talmud. 22 The responsa consist of formal replies to legal questions addressed to 14 rabbinic scholars. 23 The responsa are considered Jewish case law and speak to social, political, and economic issues.
24
In the sixth century, the responsa were collected in booklets by the Gaonim, or the presidents of rabbinical colleges in Babylonia, and disseminated in Jewish communities. 25 Over the centuries to come, responsa on Jewish law were composed by famous Jewish scholars and looked to as authoritative interpretations of halakhah. 26 Today, many collections of responsa have been republished and are still considered authoritative interpretations of Jewish law.
27
Responsa is still being written by modern experts in Jewish law in response to current questions of halakhah.
28
A key aspect of responsa is debate. 29 There is no one central authority in halakhah, nor is there a universal answer to all questions of halakhah. 30 Instead, questions are answered through an intricate method of discussion and deliberation over Jewish legal resources. 31 Jewish law precedent-consisting of majority and minority opinions on legal questions-has developed through this method of question and debate. 32 Today, the responsa are often split on how advances in modern technology affect Jewish obligations. 33 Splits in the responsa commonly occur between the different sects of Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. For instance, Orthodox Judaism follows a strict halakhic interpretation of the Jewish laws and 23 Id. 24 
Id.
25 Libson, supra note 22, at 208. 26 Rosner, supra note 15, at 212. 27 Libson, supra note 22, at 208-09 (The most famous collection of responsa that currently exists was published by A. Harkavy in 1887 and it "preserves the original forms of some of the booklets."). 28 ROBERT GORDIS, THE DYNAMICS OF JUDAISM: A STUDY IN JEWISH LAW 88 (1990) . 29 Grodin, supra note 14, at 362. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 
33 LEWITTES, supra note 9, at 207. rejects modern ideas and ways of life other than modern economic opportunities. 34 Conservative Jews consider themselves bound by Jewish law but they allow for modern changes to the laws to be intertwined with the traditional interpretations. 35 Reform Jews do not consider themselves bound by Jewish law; instead of following halakhic interpretations set by rabbis, Reform Jews interpret the laws for themselves individually.
36
In relation to how modern medicine impacts Jewish law, there has been a surge in responsa literature from all of the Jewish sects. 37 The question of the definition of death is one that has been answered with both Orthodox and Reform/Conservative voices.
B. The Jewish law definition of death
The Jewish law definition of death is divided into two schools-the traditional, or Orthodox, cardiac death standard and the more modern, or Conservative and Reform, brain death standard.
Cardiac death: The Orthodox viewpoint
The traditional, or Orthodox, view of death in Jewish law is that death occurs upon the departure of the soul from the body. 38 Since the instance of the soul departing from the body cannot be observed, death is said to coincide with the absence or cessation of breathing and heartbeat. 39 The idea that life is held in the breath stems from a passage in Genesis: "The Lord God formed man from the dust of the earth. He blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living being." 40 The twelfth-century legal scholar and philosopher Moses Maimonides explained that "[i]f upon examination, no sign of breathing can be detected at the nose, the victim must be left where he is [until after the Sabbath] because he is already dead." 41 In 34 GORDIS, supra note 28, at 93. 35 Grodin, supra note 14, at 366-67. 36 
Id.
37 LEWITTES, supra note 9, at 213. 38 Rosner, supra note 15, at 215. 39 
40 Genesis (2:7). addition to checking for signs of breath, Rashi, the renowned Talmudic commentator, added the criteria of listening for a heartbeat, as finding a heartbeat is a telltale sign of life. 42 Finally, in other commentary, Rabbi Moses Schreiber and Rabbi Sholom Mordechai Schwadron, respectively, stated that in addition to checking for breath and heartbeat, one must ensure there are no signs of life in the limbs, or that a person must be "motionless like an inanimate stone" to be considered dead. 43 It is not surprising then, that when the statements in the responsa and other commentary are pooled, the resulting three-part Orthodox Jewish law test for death, which aligns with the idea of cardiac death, is: (1) absence of spontaneous respiration; (2) absence of heartbeat; and (3) 43 Id. at 247. 44 Sokobin, supra note 4, at 524. 45 Orthodox Rabbis Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Yosef Sholom Elyashiv offered the following perspective on brain death in response to a letter asking for guidance with respect to the removal of organs for transplantation from a brain dead patient:
We have been requested to declare our views [according to Jewish law] with respect to the transplantation of a heart or other organs for the benefit of a sick person whose life is in danger, at a time when the heart of the donor is beating, and its entire brain, including the brain stem, is not functioning at all, which is known as "brain death": It is our view that it is absolutely not permissible to remove any of his organs; and to do so would involve the taking of a life. death and irreversible comas as the end of life, and accepts only the total cessation of both cardiac and respiratory activity as death. 46 The late Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, a rabbinic authority on Orthodox Judaism, affirmed the cardiac death position, noting that signs of life are in the breath rather than the brain, 47 and that only total, irreversible cessation of independent respiration can establish death. 
Practical support for the cardiac definition of death in Jewish law
The Orthodox Jewish law definition of death finds practical support in two main rationales: (1) accuracy in death determinations, and (2) the extreme importance Judaism and Jewish law places upon upholding the value of life.
i. Accuracy
Jewish law strives for accuracy, defined here as validity in determining the point at which a person can no longer recover, in determining death. For instance, before the advent of medical technology, checking for the absence of breath was the most accurate method of ascertaining whether a person was dead. As explained by the Talmudic scholar Rashi, to thoroughly determine whether a person is dead, one must check for both a heartbeat and evidence of respiration.
49
Rashi considered respiration, however, to be a more accurate indication of life than a heartbeat because a heartbeat may be difficult to hear through the body's layers of tissue, fat, and ribs. 50 Thus, the absence of a heartbeat alone cannot be interpreted as a sign of death in Jewish law, as without other signs it is not a dependable indicator.
51
The concern for accuracy in determining death under Jewish law goes beyond the requirement to check for breath. For example, it is not permitted to perform a caesarean section on a pregnant woman who is believed to be dead in 46 49 Id. at 310. 50 Id. 51 Id.
an attempt to save her baby.
52
This is because people may not be able to determine with certainty whether the mother is dead; and thus, the caesarean could be the cause of the mother's death. 53 In addition, to preserve accuracy, Jewish law cautions against mistaking a person who has fainted for a person who has died. 54 Finally, Jewish law implies that if the pronouncement of death is not accurate, grave consequences may result. For instance, Rabbi Feinstein recounts the case of a person found to be alive three days after he was interred inside a crypt. 55 Although the man went on to live a normal life and father many children, the message of the story is that the effect of a hasty determination of death can be serious.
ii. The value of life
In Judaism, human life is of infinite worth, and taking or shortening human life constitutes murder. 56 Jews believe in the "supreme sanctity of human life and of the dignity of man created in the image of God." 57 Moreover, the Bible emphasizes a continuing obligation to heal or save the life of an endangered person, predicated upon a verse from Leviticus that instructs "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow."
58 It is from this passage that the Jewish law duty for a physician to do everything within reason to save the patient arises. woman's life, organ transplant for those who can be saved, and autopsy if the results would yield information that could save another life. 60 Moreover, the importance placed on life in Jewish law is exemplified by the fact that there is an affirmative obligation for a physician to do everything within his power to try to resuscitate the patient. 61 Most Jewish legal scholars would not require a doctor to go to superhuman lengths to prolong the life of a hopelessly ill individual, but once life-saving measures are instituted, it is forbidden to stop the measures before the patient naturally ceases automatic respiration and heartbeat. 62 Under Jewish law, it is not appropriate to declare a person dead until all reasonable life-saving measures have been exhausted. 63 Orthodox Jewish law disallows the removal of a brain dead person from life support until the person's heart has independently stopped beating.
64
This position is supported by Agudath Israel of America, a leading traditionalist organization of Orthodox Jews, 65 that offered the halakhik interpretation that removing organs from brain dead patients for transplant is tantamount to murder.
66
In sum, the significance of the cardiac standard of death is supported by two practical justifications-accuracy and maintaining the value of life-that arise from halakhic interpretation of Jewish texts. In contrast, the Conservative and Reform viewpoint that the brain death standard fulfills Jewish law criteria for the definition of death is influenced by medical advances and modern ethics.
Brain death: The Conservative and Reform viewpoint
The Conservative and Reform movements in Judaism are associated with the brain death standard as stated in the UDDA. 67 For a determination of death, the brain death standard requires "irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem." 68 The Conservative and Reform viewpoint is not based on established Orthodox methods of halakhic interpretation of religious texts. 69 Other examples of where Conservative and Reform interpretation of Jewish law differs from Orthodox interpretation of Jewish law include that Reform or Conservative rabbis may permit the use of electricity on specific holidays while Orthodox rabbis would not. 70 Likewise, Reform and Conservative rabbis may permit Passover matzah to be baked by using modern technology-such as a mechanized oven-while Orthodox rabbis would permit the matzah to be baked only in the traditional way-by hand. 72 Rabbi Tendler equates complete destruction of the brain with decapitation and concludes that if the brain has been completely destroyed death has occurred because even under biblical standards, "the death throes of a decapitated man were never considered residual life but simply manifestations of cellular life that continued after death of the entire organism." 73 Further support for the brain death standard outside of halakhic interpretation but rooted in Jewish principles is evidenced by the fact that "[r]espect for the dead is mandated. Jewish law requires the physician to do everything in his power to prolong life, but prohibits the use of measures that prolong the act of 68 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1. "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards." Entire brain death does not include neocortical death or a persistent vegetative state. Id. at Prefatory Note.
69 See Grodin, supra note 14, at 366-67. 70 LEWITTES, supra note 9, at 208 (noting that Sephardic rabbis permit the use of electric light on Yom Tov while Ashkenazi rabbis do not). 71 Id. at 209-10. 72 Sokobin, supra note 4, at 523. dying." 74 The use of technology to keep brain dead patients alive can be viewed as an extension of the death process. In this way, the brain death standard comports with the Jewish law rationale that death should not be prolonged as well as spares families the agony of watching a loved one "experience a protracted death." 75 Finally, in Jewish law there is no obligation to attempt to revive the dead. 76 When a patient shows irreversible cessation of cardiac and respiratory activity accompanied by the appearance that the patient is dead, the Jewish law criteria for death are fulfilled and the doctor is relieved of his obligation to try to revive the patient. 77 Brain death fulfills these same criteria, and similarly recognizes the point at which it is futile to try to revive a person.
In sum, based on modern medical advances combined with traditional ideals, the Conservative and Reform sects of Judaism consider brain death to be the point at which the Jewish law criteria for death are fulfilled. However, brain death does not fulfill the Orthodox definition of death because the above arguments are not rooted in the halakhic method of debate; rather, they are rooted in Jewish principles and the convenience provided by modern technological advances. Like the Conservative and Reform movements in Judaism, the UDDA supports the brain death standard.
III. Overview of the UDDA
The UDDA, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in conjunction with the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association, was created in 1981, about the time when interest in definition of death statutes arose due to advances in modern medicine that altered the death process. Today, thirty-four states have codified the UDDA. 78 Every other state has adopted, through statutory law or through the decision of the state's highest court, a version of the brain death standard. Death statutes provide a standardized definition of death which is necessary for the smooth operation of a host of legal and family-related issues. For instance, while the UDDA notes that alone it does not establish affirmative law or policy regarding "living wills, death with dignity, euthanasia, rules on death certificates, maintaining life support beyond brain death in cases of pregnant women or of organ donors, and protection for the dead body," 80 the definition of death found in the UDDA can be adopted by any state and inserted into a variety of statutory provisions regarding these very matters. Moreover, the UDDA can be incorporated into definition of death statutes that in turn have implications for insurance policies, tax law, probate, and criminal law in the homicide context. Thus, in addition to the personal and private meaning attached to the definition of death, there is significant meaning for, and impact on, many processes in the American legal system.
Before the UDDA and before the development of machines that could artificially maintain cardiorespiratory functions, the common law definition of death was similar to the Jewish law definition of death; it included absence of traditional vital signs-such as breathing and heartbeat-indicative of life. 81 Formerly, termination of breathing and heartbeat always resulted in destruction of the brain, and in the reverse, destruction of the brain always resulted in termination of breathing and heartbeat. 82 With the advent of artificial circulation and respiration machines, it is now possible to maintain breathing and circulation when a person's brain has been destroyed. 83 Thus, the UDDA was created to provide a "comprehensive basis for determining death in all situations." 84 The UDDA advocates the position that "irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is death" because without artificial support, brain death would eventually result in cessation of heartbeat and breathing, or cardiac death.
85
The UDDA definition of death is controversial, especially for those who follow the Orthodox Jewish law definition of death, because the UDDA 80 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT at Prefatory Note. 81 Sokobin, supra note 4, at 519. 82 Veith et al., supra note 73, at 1651. 83 Id.
84 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT at Prefatory Note. 85 Id. § 1.
definition allows physicians to remove a patient from life support if the patient's brain no longer functions but the patient's heart and lungs still function due to life support. In such a scenario, the secular brain death standard would be fulfilled but the Jewish law cardiac death standard would not be fulfilled.
IV. Arguments that provide practical support for cardiac death also support UDDA arguments for brain death
Although there is tension between the secular and religious definitions of death, after deeper analysis it becomes clear that the practical arguments that support each standard are the same. The rationales behind cardiac deathaccuracy and maintaining the value of life-also support brain death.
The commonalities between the arguments supporting the two standards demonstrate that since biblical times people have held relatively unchanging feelings about the definition of death; we want to be sure about who is dead and who is alive because we value life. However, despite that the justifications for both standards stem from the same arguments, brain death is not the appropriate standard for Orthodox Judaism because it is not rooted in halakhic interpretation and the word of God as the cardiac death standard is. The fact that the cardiac death standard also promotes accuracy and preserves the high value placed on life in Jewish culture is simply incidental to the halakhic interpretation.
The Jewish legal rules are binding on Orthodox Jews despite advances in modern technology that have made the brain death standard possible and despite that brain death may accomplish the same practical ends as the cardiac death standard. While "American law clings to medical solutions, Jewish law clings to verities that have sustained it through the centuries."
86
Because religious concerns are not adequately addressed under the brain death standard exclusively, brain death with a religious exception is the most appropriate standard for American society today.
What follows is an exploration-with an eye towards why the brain death standard is not appropriate under the Orthodox view of death-of the commonalities in the rationales behind the two standards. The commonalities demonstrate that fifty state adoption of the UDDA definition of death with a religious exception would not greatly impede the secular goals of death statutes because the Jewish law standard seeks to accomplish the same goals of accuracy and preservation of the value of life.
A. Accuracy
Accuracy concerns govern the brain death definition of death just as accuracy concerns are present in the Jewish law definition of death. For instance, whole brain death was selected as the brain death standard over other losses of brain function, such as loss of consciousness, because medical science can accurately determine whole brain death but cannot yet accurately "establish whether an unconscious patient, who has suffered only partial loss of brain function, has permanently lost consciousness."
87 Destruction of the whole brain, including the brain stem, guarantees that critical nerve centers that make it possible for the brain to function are destroyed. 88 With the destruction of the brain stem comes death of the entire cerebrum, at which point the brain is unable to regain functionality.
89
Numerous studies document the accuracy of brain death; clinically, it is currently considered to be the most exact criterion for measuring death.
90
The practical concern surrounding accuracy common to both secular and Jewish law illustrates a shared desire to avoid false positives in death determinations. In 1977, when Rabbi Bleich offered his opinion in favor of cardiac death as the Jewish law standard, he did not believe medical technology was sufficiently advanced to determine with certainty whether total brain death had occurred and the brain was completely destroyed unless the person had been decapitated, which clearly destroys brain function. 91 Today, science has proven brain death to be a good measure of death, 92 which supports the proposition that like the early followers of Jewish law who were highly concerned with accuracy, it is still imperative today that secular society strive to embrace an accurate method for determining death.
Predictability goes hand in hand with accuracy. The UDDA provides predictability because it offers a single standard by which all states may abide. Imagine the chaos that would result if one could simply cross state lines with a loved one so as to avoid a declaration of death in one state to find a proclamation of life in another. In addition, a consistent definition of death can lessen the chances of liability for doctors and hospitals, and can give patients and families peace of mind by providing closure. Moreover, predictability in death declarations is valued today because it facilitates commencement of the mourning process, probate procedures, life insurance distributions, and a general wrapping up of the deceased person's affairs.
Accuracy in the death declaration today, as in biblical times, helps avoid harsh consequences. In biblical times, the harsh consequence at issue was generally an unintended death resulting from a false death declaration. Today, while a false positive is still a risk, other risks include avoidance of death declarations by moving between states, liability for the medical profession, and a delay of the probate and mourning process.
B. The value of life
American law, represented by the UDDA in this article, is similar to Jewish law in that it places a high value on human life. For instance, one of the values of the UDDA brain death standard is that it promotes organ donation by promoting the transfer of organs while they are more viable, thus avoiding the fast deterioration of organs in patients whose blood has stopped pumping. 93 By improving the organ donation process, more people in need of functioning organs who have a chance of recovery are able to receive organs they would otherwise have to go without. Therefore, the UDDA's promotion of organ donation demonstrates the American concern for the value of life by aiding those in need and increasing their chances of survival.
Moreover, organ donation promotes resource efficiency, which in turn supports the American value of life ideal by ensuring that those who can benefit most from a hospital bed and professional medical care receive the needed resources.
Jewish law echoes the American law perspective by pointing us back to biblical times before organ donation was feasible, but when people still recognized the importance of saving a life if at all possible. Jewish law permits 93 Yitzchok, supra note 75.
doctors to abandon those without hope, and focus on those with hope, 94 which is precisely what the process of organ donation accomplishes today. Thus, the UDDA brain death standard comports with both the Jewish and American reverence for human life by helping organ donation become a more widely used practice and thereby allowing more people to benefit from life saving organ transplants.
With arguments to prove that the cardiac death rationale in Jewish law supports the brain death rationale based on shared concerns for accuracy and the value of life, in addition to the Conservative and Reform viewpoints that Jewish law supports brain death, 95 it seems logical to conclude that brain death is the appropriate standard by which secular, American law should establish death today. The trouble with this conclusion is that should the brain death standard reign supreme, it would preclude people like Mr. Halberstam-the fifteen-year old who was fatally shot in 1994 while inside a van driving across the Brooklyn Bridge-from dying in accordance with their religious beliefs because followers of Orthodox Judaism abide by the cardiac death standard. Thus, the brain death definition of death would not be complete without a religious exception. In addition, allowing an exception to the brain death standard for followers of cardiac death would not substantially disturb the secular goals of maintaining of accuracy and the value of life in death determinations.
V. Religious exception to the brain death standard
A religious exception to the brain death standard is appropriate because without a religious exception a brain death statute would burden the free exercise of religion. To allow a religious exception meets the constitutional standard for free exercise of religion and does not usurp the justifications offered in support of brain death. 96 94 ROSNER, MODERN MEDICINE, supra note 42, at 218. Jewish law does not require a doctor to continue trying to save a patient who is past the point of saving, nor does Jewish law require patients to go to every length possible to prolong life. Id.
See supra § II(B)(ii).
96 While this article supports the view that the fairest definition of death statute is one that contains a religious exception, such an exception would raise questions not fully addressed in this article. Other issues implicated by adopting a religious exception to the definition of death include determinations of liability for doctors and hospitals should they be regarded as state actors, issues of taxation, the question of when Social Security and life insurance distributions should be made, and the proper procedure for resolving a family dispute over the definition of death for a family member.
A. The constitutional standard for the free exercise of religion
The First Amendment, which has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states, houses the Free Exercise Clause which provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 97 The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds v. United States, reasoning that "Congress cannot pass a law . . . which shall prohibit the free exercise of religion." 98 The Supreme Court found in Reynolds that outlawing polygamy was appropriate because the law did not impermissibly "interfere with mere religious belief and opinions"; rather, the law appropriately outlawed a religious practice that the Court deemed harmful to society. 99 The Supreme Court reasoned that it would permit government interference with religion when religious "principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." 100 Thus, in its most basic form, the Free Exercise Clause guarantees the idea of religious freedom unless the religious practice at issue harms society at large. The Court developed the parameters of this idea in later cases.
Following Reynolds, the Supreme Court and Congress have had a rocky relationship with the Free Exercise Clause as each branch has tried to overturn the other to bring competing definitions of religious freedom to American citizens. Almost a century after Reynolds, the Supreme Court addressed the Free Exercise Clause again in Sherbert v. Verner. 101 In Sherbert, the Court found that a law denying unemployment compensation to a woman whose job conflicted with the practice of her religion was unconstitutional because the law was not supported by a compelling state interest. 102 The Court determined that laws that burden the practice of religion must be analyzed under strict scrutiny; there must be a compelling state interest supporting any such regulations. 103 The Court established a four-factor test to determine if an individual's right to free exercise of religion has been violated by the government. Rather, the Court determined that the legislation outlawing peyote incidentally prohibited a religiously mandated activity but that this was constitutional because the peyote ban was generally applicable to all citizens. 115 The Court noted that while states have the power to allow otherwise illegal activities done pursuant to religious beliefs, states are not required to allow such activities.
116
After Smith, the Sherbert Test no longer applies to claims that the government violated an individual's right to free exercise. The result of the holding in Smith was that for a court to find a law to be in violation of the Free Exercise Clause the petitioner had to show that the law was one of general applicability, that the law burdened free exercise and also burdened another fundamental right, and that the law did not withstand strict scrutiny.
117
For instance, the situation in Yoder fulfills the Smith criteria because in Yoder the Wisconsin law of requiring students to attend high school was one of general applicability, the law burdened the Amish practice of religion at the same time it burdened Amish parents' fundamental right to direct the education of their children, and the law did not withstand strict scrutiny because it did not further a compelling state interest. 114 Id. at 886-88 (noting that using strict scrutiny in the situation in Smith would "produce a constitutional anomaly" because it would create "a private right to ignore generally applicable laws"). 115 Id. at 879-82 (explaining that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)") (internal citations omitted). 116 Id. at 882. 117 Id. at 881. 118 Id. at 881 n.1 ("[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed [in Yoder], more than merely a reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State is required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment") (internal citations omitted).
In response to the narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
119 RFRA was intended to protect the free exercise of religion and it reinstated the Sherbert Test. 120 However, the Supreme Court overturned RFRA shortly after its creation in City of Bourne v. Flores, finding that RFRA unconstitutionally attempted to usurp the Supreme Court's power to interpret the Constitution. 121 Thus, the test set out in Smith-state infringement on freedom of religion plus infringement an additional fundamental right-is the constitutional standard by which to bring a Freedom of Religion claim today.
B. An exception to brain death statutes for the Jewish law cardiac death standard is warranted under Smith
The UDDA brain death definition of death is appropriate for a Free Exercise Clause exception from state determination of death statutes under Smith because without an exception the brain death standard burdens those who follow Orthodox Judaism by not allowing the cardiac standard of death to be used. Per the requirements of Smith that in order to challenge a law for violating the Free Exercise Clause both free exercise and a fundamental right must be burdened by the law, the fundamental right at issue is privacy-an individual's privacy to die within the parameters set by that individual's religion. Finally, a definition of death statute that disallows cardiac death does not withstand strict scrutiny because it does not fulfill a compelling state interest.
Burden on the free exercise of religion
Free exercise is burdened because a statute that allows only brain death would deny Jews, such as Mr. Halbertstam-the Jewish teenager who was fatally shot while crossing the Brooklyn Bridge-the opportunity to die in accordance with the Jewish law cardiac definition of death. This is significant because if Mr. Halbertstam were to be declared dead under the brain death standard he could potentially still be alive under the cardiac standard and thus Jewish law would consider the premature death declaration tantamount to murder. In addition, to 
Burden on the fundamental right to privacy
In addition to a burden on the free exercise of religion, disallowing the cardiac death standard violates Orthodox Jews' fundamental right to privacy. Death is a private matter because "[a]fter birth, death is the most significant event for the living. The dividing event between life and death focuses on profound practical metaphysical and theological questions regarding the nature and meaning of life and the 'hereafter'." 123 The United States Supreme Court declared privacy a fundamental right protected by the Constitution in Griswold v. Connecticut. 124 In Griswold, the majority found that while the right to privacy is not express in the Constitution, it is protected in the "penumbras" of other constitutional safeguards. 125 In concurrence, Justice Goldberg found the right to privacy in the Ninth Amendment. 126 Also in concurrence, Justice Harlan found the right to privacy in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 127 The Supreme Court has reinforced the right to privacy in subsequent decisions, such as Roe v. Wade, wherein the Court based its holding that a woman may abort her pregnancy for any reason, up until the point at which the fetus becomes viable, on the Constitutional right to privacy found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
128 Roe restricts the government's ability to define the beginning of life in a way that burden's a woman's right to privacy.
129 Similarly, the government should be restricted from defining the end of life in a way that would burden a Jewish person's right to the privacy. 130 Further, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found that a Texas anti-sodomy statute was unconstitutional because it attempted to control private, sexual behavior in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 131 In other cases, the Supreme Court has found privacy interests relating to marriage, 132 procreation, 133 contraception, 134 family relationships and child rearing, 135 and education.
136
The above-noted privacy interests all relate to serious, personal, and familyorientated matters that the Court refrains from intruding on. The definition of death is a similarly serious, personal, and family-related matter because it triggers other interpersonal processes, such as grieving, the probate and will process, commencement of life insurance payments, transfer of estates, organ donation, and autopsies. 137 It cannot be denied that each of these issues is a solemn, personal decision that deeply impacts the deceased person's family. 129 See id. 141 In that case, the court recognized "fundamental principles of individual autonomy" and reasoned that:
[I]t does not advance the interest of the State or the ward to treat the ward as a person of lesser status or dignity than others. To protect the incompetent person within its power, the State must recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford to that person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent persons.
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Likewise, the idea of dignity extends to the definition of death in that allowing a person to die in accordance with specific religious beliefs affords that person dignity, and respects that person's privacy interest in their final and most vulnerable moments.
In sum, the definition of death deserves constitutional privacy protection. 144 See Stacy, supra note 8, at 534. 145 Id. at 541. both standards harbor the same concerns-accuracy and preservation of the value of life. Finally, as the next section explains, protecting the Jewish law definition of death does not substantially burden typical state interests such as uniformity in application of the law, preservation of life, and maintaining hospital efficiency. Thus, there is no compelling state interest that would prevent implementation of the cardiac death standard. (c) Death, as determined in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this section, shall be deemed to have occurred as of the time of the completion of the determination of death.
(d) Prior to the completion of a determination of death of an individual in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the hospital shall make reasonable efforts to notify the individual's next of kin or other person closest to the individual that such determination will soon be completed.
(e) Each hospital shall establish and implement a written policy regarding determinations of death in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Such policy shall include:
(1) a description of the tests to be employed in making the determination; applies specifically to those who reject the brain death standard of death. 147 The New York regulation accommodates both the brain death and cardiac death standards without disrupting state interests in uniformity, preservation of life, or hospital efficiency.
i. State interest in uniformity
The UDDA promotes government interest in uniformity in determining death because adoption of the UDDA by every state would standardize the definition of death across the United States. As a result, citizens would not be able to be declared dead in one state but cross state lines to be found alive in another. This is an important state interest because it fosters uniformity in death-related procedures such as life insurance, pension, and Social Security distribution, as well as probate and taxation.
Because only a select few-the Orthodox Jewish community-stand to raise the religious exception for cardiac death, uniformity in determining death will not be significantly disrupted by allowing an exception for cardiac death. The exception will apply in a small number of cases; only those who have "strong convictions are likely to make the necessary effort to invoke the exemption." 148 Further, it is arguable that uniformity is not a state interest compelling enough in all situations to stand in the way of privacy concerns and the free exercise of religion, especially if, as the New York regulation demonstrates, the laws can be crafted to accommodate both uniformity and free exercise of religion. 
Id.
147 Grodin, supra note 14, at 368. The New York regulation achieves uniformity in that it requires hospitals to make reasonable efforts to contact the patient's next of kin before a determination of death is made according to the brain death standard. 150 Notice of the religious accommodation must occur before death has been declared thereby ensuring application of the law occurs in a uniform way; the law is applied to each patient while he is still technically alive. 151 The law does not permit the religious standard to reverse the secular standard once the secular standard has been followed. In sum, by specifying the timing of the application of the law and by virtue of the fact that a cardiac death exception will not pertain to those choosing idiosyncratic definitions of death, the religious exception will operate only for those whose deeply held religious convictions reject the brain death standard. Thus, the religious exception will not disrupt state interest in uniform application of the laws. 154 The court notes that "[t]he importance of the preservation of life is memorialized in various organic documents" such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the New Jersey Constitution, which all give men certain unalienable rights, "among which of those are of enjoying and defending life."
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The New York law promotes the state's interest in preserving life because the law does not require absolute accommodation of the cardiac death standard under all circumstances. Instead, the law requires hospitals to make a "reasonable" effort to contact the next of kin so that the cardiac death standard 150 Id. at 56. 151 Id. at 57. The delay of a declaration of death until after the family has been notified of the patient's condition allows health coverage to continue until the cardiac death standard is fulfilled because despite possible brain death the official death declaration has not been made yet; thus, the patient is still considered alive for the purposes of insurance coverage. Grodin, supra note 14, at 368. 152 Grodin, supra note 14, at 368. 153 Olick, supra note 148, at 278. 154 In the Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 652 n.1 (N.J. 1976). 155 Id.
can be implemented if so desired.
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The Regulatory Impact Statement that accompanies the New York regulation suggests that the religious exception would not apply in emergency situations where "maintenance of a brain dead person would result in harm to another patient for whom meaningful life could be saved."
157 This viewpoint comports with the Jewish law interest in preserving life and makes sense in cases where organ donation could save the life of another. Thus, in triage cases it would be possible, under New York's law, for the state's interest in preserving life to override the religious interest in applying the cardiac death standard.
iii. State interest in hospital efficiency
The government has an interest in allowing hospitals to run efficiently, and has an obligation to avoid encumbering hospitals with unduly burdensome regulations that would require hospitals to go to great lengths to accommodate religious exceptions to the brain death standard. The New York law is not unduly burdensome because it requires only that hospitals alert the patient's next of kin to the patient's condition. 158 Hospitals do not have an affirmative duty to inform next of kin of the religious exception, nor do hospitals have to obtain consent to use of the brain death standard. 159 After the hospital provides notice, it is the responsibility of the next of kin to invoke the exception if desired. Thus, the law does not saddle hospitals with an unmanageable standard; rather, it clearly sets out the notice obligation and leaves the patient's family to determine the rest.
Moreover, the New York law does not burden hospitals with the excessive costs of maintaining patients who meet the standard for brain death but do not meet the standard for cardiac death. Because the law will apply in only a small number of cases-only those with deeply held religious convictions-any increase in cost will be negligible and cannot be considered a compelling state interest such that it would override the constitutionally protected right to freedom of religion. The New York law exemplifies the balance between state interest and freedom of religion. The law respectfully accommodates the religious interest in having the exception available as well as preserves the state's interests in uniformity, preservation of life, and maintaining hospital efficiency. There are no competing state interests that would be damaged by use of the cardiac death standard.
VI. Conclusion
The ancient tenets of Jewish law show us that we should strive for the most accurate and life-respecting standard available when making declarations of death. Today, that standard is brain death, as it appears in the UDDA. However, the problem with implementing a strict brain death standard lies in that it would preclude followers of Orthodox Judaism from dying under their religiouslymandated standard of cardiac death. Excluding Orthodox Jews from the standard is troublesome because in most states physicians alone have the power to disconnect a patient from life support once the legal criteria for death are fulfilled. 160 Most states do not mandate that the physician defer to the wishes of the patient or family. 161 New York offers a regulation that falls in line with the provisions argued for in this article because the New York law includes a religious exception, thereby avoiding a free exercise violation, and the law also promotes other important secular and state interests. 162 The New York regulation proved useful for Mr. Halberstam's family when he was declared brain dead and thus fulfilled the brain death standard, but because his heart could still beat independently he did not fulfill the cardiac death standard preferred by his family.
It is probable that there are others across the United States who may encounter the same unfortunate situation as Mr. Halberstam. Therefore, all states should adopt the UDDA definition of death with a religious exception as New York has. Not only would an exception provide religious comfort to families in sad times, but the exception is permitted under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and the right to privacy. Furthermore, the exception does not negate the secular justifications offered in support of brain death, as the Jewish law cardiac death standard promotes the same rationales of accuracy and the 160 Yitzchok, supra note 75. 161 Id. value of life. The exception also does not interfere with state interests in uniformity, preservation of life, and hospital efficiency.
In conclusion, adoption of the UDDA brain death standard with a religious exception for cardiac death not only permits freedom to practice the Jewish religion in matters as serious, private, and personal as death, but also accomplishes secular goals and preserves state interests.
